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Recency effects are well documented in the adult and infant
literature: recognition and recall memory are better for recently
occurring events. We explore recency effects in infant
categorization, which does not merely involve memory for
individual items, but the formation of abstract category
representations. We present a computational model of infant
categorization that simulates category learning in 10-month-
olds. The model predicts that recency effects outweigh
previously reported order effects for the same stimuli.
According to the model, infant behaviour at test should depend
mainly on the identity of the most recent training item. We
evaluate these predictions in a series of experiments with 10-
month-old infants. Our results show that infant behaviour
confirms the model’s prediction. In particular, at test infants
exhibited a preference for a category outlier over the category
average only if the final training item had been close to the
average, rather than distant from it. Our results are consistent
with a view of categorization as a highly dynamic process
where the end result of category learning is not the overall
average of all stimuli encountered, but rather a fluid
representation that moves depending on moment-to-moment
novelty. We argue that this is a desirable property of a flexible
cognitive system that adapts rapidly to different contexts.1. Introduction
The ability to form categories is a core cognitive ability that allows
us to structure the world. ‘Categorization’ implies treating distinct
items as similar, requiring the same response [1]. When infants
begin to understand the structure of the world, the vast majority
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2of stimuli are novel and categories need to be learned. Many studies have investigated how the ability to
group objects changes throughout infancy and what factors influence this process, such as the feature
distribution provided in the input [2–4], the presence of verbal labels [5–7] or the function of an object
([8], for a review, see [9]). Models of categorization agree that learning is information aggregation, but
how exactly a mental representation is constructed from the encountered exemplars remains an open
question. Infant category learning is often studied in familiarization paradigms, where a sequence of
objects from the target category is presented as a learning phase, prior to one or several test trials
during which the established representation is probed. Such familiarization procedures can be used to
tap into already existing category representations [10,11], where the assumption is that they activate
previously acquired knowledge. The focus in the current paper is, by contrast, on learning novel
categories where prior representations cannot be used for grouping objects. The received wisdom
under this scenario is that infants extract regularities of the familiarized stimulus set over time,
constructing an abstract category representation or even more than one, if the familiarization set
consists of several clusters. At test infants demonstrate the formation of such categories by exhibiting
novelty preference for an out-of-category (OOC) item over a new item from a familiarized category
[3,12–15]. Implicit in this logic is the idea that the category representation is, by that point, fixed, or at
least converging to a category centroid.
Here, we propose by contrast that the category representation is much more fluid, affected to a great
deal by recent memory, and that infant looking behaviour reflects these moment-to-moment shifts in
category representation. We argue that this is the very property that allows for continuous learning
and adaptation to varying context, allowing the human cognitive system to be highly flexible.
In real life, in contrast to laboratory experiments on category learning, there is no segregation of
learning phase and test: every time an object is encountered, a category needs to be activated, and this
process depends on similarity to previously encountered exemplars, as well as proximity in time. For
example, if a child meets a horse in the meadow after an ordinary day during which she has
encountered the neighbour’s dog and some pigeons in the park, the horse may be interesting on the
basis of its sheer size and general shape. By contrast, if the same horse is encountered on a day the child
was taken to a horse farm, encountering the horse in the meadow will activate recent memories of the
animals seen during the day—and they are likely to be very detailed. This might highlight, for example,
the fact that this particular horse has a white blaze—in particular if the other horses did not have such a
mark. In other words, how remarkable or interesting a particular exemplar is depends entirely on context.
We consider the events described above—encountering a horse after having seen other members of
the same category—as a form of priming: if similar items have been encountered in the recent past, a
corresponding mental representation is easily activated—but it is biased towards the particular recent
experience. As we shall argue, this is essentially what occurs in a familiarization procedure. When the
test trial is encountered, the representation that is activated is not a fixed entity with a centroid and a
boundary. It is instead a representation shaped by the stimuli that have been seen during
familiarization, and partially activated by the most recent one.
Here, we demonstrate a recency effect in a self-organizing map model of infant categorization, which
allowed us to generate precise predictions for the behaviour of 10-month-old infants. Recency effects are
well-documented in the adult [16,17] and infant [18] literature, but here we link these memory effects
explicitly to category formation. As we shall see, the infant data correspond closely to the model’s
prediction: after familiarization with the same set of eight stimuli, a preference for a category outlier is
either achieved or not, depending on the final familiarization stimulus that precedes the test trial. The
model allows us to inspect how categories are encoded by the model. Observing the internal category
representation in the model directly provides insight into the mechanisms at work.
In summary, we argue here that category activation does not merely involve invoking a pre-existing
abstract representation, but is inherently linked to memory. Consequently, differences in novelty
preference across infants may often not merely represent noise in the system, but reflect a tight
coupling between infants’ most recent experiences and a flexibly adapting category representation. The
central role of memory in human category learning, specifically in adults, has been highlighted
previously (e.g. [19,20]). However, our view specifically focuses on memory effects in infant
familiarization as an online process.
Our view of categorization as closely intertwined with memory processes is consistent with
other accounts of categorization that take seriously the emergence of categories in real time and
emphasize the role of the encoding of individual stimuli versus the crystallization of a category
representation from these occurrences [21–23]. Our model of categorization is convergent with
approaches that follow a dynamic systems view of cognition [24–26], but adopts a more abstract
r
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As described above, category learning in infants is often assessed using familiarization with a category
involving several distinct exemplars, followed by a novelty preference test. Here, infants are presented
with a novel within-category test stimulus and a novel OOC item simultaneously. A preference for
the OOC item is taken as an index of successful categorization [27–32]. This builds onto earlier
paradigms first established by Fantz [30], who found that infants presented with novel and familiar
images side by side rapidly progress to preferring novel over repeated stimuli. An alternative
procedure involves habituation to criterion, i.e. the continued presentation of stimuli until looking has
decreased to a specific point, usually specified as a proportion of looking duration measured for
the first item(s). In this kind of paradigm infants are often presented with single items at test, i.e.
‘preference’ is not established on a single display but by evaluating how looking time changes across
trials. Here, a novel item from the familiar category is presented prior to presenting the OOC item,
and the expectation is that looking will not increase for the novel item from the familiar category, but
for the OOC item [33]. This is often used where examination of toy objects is employed as a metric
instead of looking time (e.g. [22,34,35]). The logic of the novelty preference procedure rests on the
interpretation of looking time as a measure of surprise. Longer looking at the OOC item suggests that
it is less similar to the infant’s internal category representation of the familiarization stimuli than the
within-category item, i.e. less expected. In fact, Strauss [36] argued that infants formed categories on
the basis of prototypes corresponding to the average of the stimuli they experienced.
Different approaches investigating infant categorization have considered memory as a core factor.
One of these is Westermann & Mareschal’s [37] model. These authors provide a dual-systems
approach to categorization, where a fast-learning ‘hippocampal’ system is linked with a slow-learning
‘cortical’ system (both implemented as auto-encoders but trained with different learning rates). Their
model successfully simulated results such as the development of global before basic-level categories
that is observed in manual object exploration tasks and generalized imitation studies (e.g. [10]), which
has given rise to the controversial theory that perceptual and conceptual categorization rely on two
different processes. Effects of prior knowledge on familiarization results [38] are simulated in the
same model. As such, this approach provides an elegant solution to the controversial question of how
perceptual and conceptual categorization relate to each other that does not require two separate
processes but uses a single system. While Westermann and Mareschal’s approach places an emphasis
on the role of memory in categorization, the focus in their model is explicitly on differences between
rapid online processes and slower processes integrating new information with existing knowledge.
In the present paper, by contrast, we direct our attention specifically to memory effects in online
category learning. While item memory during familiarization has been investigated in the literature
[39–42], many of these approaches did not address the nature of the category being learned but were
instead focused on establishing whether or not infants showed evidence for remembering a particular
exemplar. By contrast, Mareschal et al. [43] examined how infants’ object examination time during a
categorization task differed as a function of similarity between individual items. They provided
evidence for an effect of the previous item on examination time for the current item. If the second
item in the sequence was dissimilar to the first, then seven- to nine-month-olds’ examination times
were longer than if the second item was similar to the first. This effect appears to reflect online
processes as discussed above, and is consistent with the hypothesis that memory for the most recent
item plays a large role. A series of studies by Oakes and colleagues provided further insight into
context effects during infants’ learning. Oakes & Ribar [23] as well as Kovack-Lesh & Oakes [21]
showed that presenting stimuli in pairs instead of individual items affects categorization behaviour.
Four-month-old infants, for instance, formed more exclusive categories in the former than in the latter
case. Since the formation of a more narrow category indicates that more detailed features of the
viewed items are represented, this implies that studying items side by side benefits the identification
or extraction of such relevant features. Once again, the way infants inspect a new item is shown to be
context-dependent.
Gliozzi et al. [44] presented a neurocomputational model of familiarization and labelling (simulating
infant results which demonstrated that labels modulate category boundaries [7]). This model suggested
the existence of sequence effects [45]. On this basis, Mather & Plunkett [46] investigated item succession
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4in detail. They manipulated the ‘Euclidean distance’ between successive items across a set of eight
familiarization items, meaning that infants in one group saw a sequence in which successive items were
likely to be quite similar (termed ‘low Euclidean distance’ sequences in their paper), whereas infants in
another group saw a sequence in which successive items were likely to be dissimilar. Importantly the
actual stimulus set for both groups was identical—only the order changed. Their results indicated that
infants in the ‘high distance’ (dissimilar successive items) condition were likely to show novelty
preference for an atypical item, whereas infants in the ‘low distance’ (similar successive items) condition
were likely to show a null preference. The authors argued that switching between dissimilar items
during familiarization allowed infants to mentally represent a greater amount of the feature space (see
[45] for discussion). While originating from a hypothesis that was based on computational modelling
with self-organizing maps [45], Mather & Plunkett’s [46] results were subsequently also simulated with
an auto-encoder network by Twomey & Westermann [47], which successfully captured the difference
between high- and low-distance sequences. The inherent geometry of the feature space used in this
experiment appears to explain the variability between infants’ looking preferences, and can be captured
by a learning device that is geared towards discovering regularities within this space.
Here we shall argue, however, that a more compelling explanation is that these results are driven by
memory constraints and priming effects.Sci.7:2003283. Rationale: hypothesizing recency effects
Our starting point was a simulation of familiarization with sequences used byMather & Plunkett [46]. We
used Gliozzi et al.’s [44] model (subjected to small adaptions, see below). This will be presented below in
detail as Simulation 1. We expected the model to exhibit a difference between high and low average
Euclidean distance sequences, as reported by Mather and Plunkett. The model indeed behaved as
expected during the test trials—i.e. it exhibited a higher preference for the peripheral item when trained
with a high-distance condition. However, inspecting model behaviour during training showed an
unexpected effect: it appeared that a better predictor of test performance was the final familiarization
item. The stimulus set used by Mather & Plunkett [46] was originally constructed by Younger [3]. The
pair of test stimuli is constructed such that one represents the overall average of all familiarization
items, while the other represents an outlier, or peripheral item, in the feature space. As we shall see
below, in Simulation 1 we observed that whenever the final familiarization item was close to the overall
average of all stimuli, the network ended up exhibiting a clear preference for the peripheral item at test.
Whenever that last familiarization item was further away from the overall average, the model’s
quantization error for the two test items was approximately equal. Since the modelling results in
general corresponded remarkably well to the infant data reported by Mather & Plunkett [46] this led us
to hypothesize that recency effects were responsible for test performance in infant categorization.
In the following section, we first present the model itself. We then proceed to a formal presentation of
Simulation 1, which consists of modelling Mather & Plunkett’s infant experiments. Then we set out to test
the hypothesis that recency effects are in fact the driving factor behind novelty preference in test trials.
Testing this involves a new 2 × 2 experimental design with sequences manipulating both the factors
Euclidean distance and the type of final familiarization stimulus. We first report simulation results using
these new sequences (Simulation 2), which makes clear predictions for infant experiments. These are
confirmed by our studies with 10-month-olds, which we finally present in the section ‘Infant experiment’.4. Simulations
4.1. Model overview
The novelty preference task, and categorization processes, can be simulated using neural network models.
Here we use a self-organizing map (or SOM) which emphasizes the process of learning category structure
online in a training procedure similar to that experienced by infants during familiarization. Training
involves presenting each familiarization stimulus exactly once, and the discrepancy between the
model’s internal category representation and the currently presented stimulus represents looking time.
The self-organizing map consists of a two-dimensional layer of interconnected units, fully connected to
an input vector that represents successive training stimuli. Each unit is associated with a position in
feature space, and the model responds to a new stimulus by activating the unit that is closest to the
stimulus’s feature representation. To determine this, we calculate the ‘quantization error’, or distance of
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rsos
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5each unit in themap to the input. The ‘best-matching unit (BMU)’ is the onewith the lowest error. Learning
involves moving this unit even closer to the stimulus representation (reducing the error), and also moving
other units close by in the same direction. The quantization error associated with the BMU in the model is
the equivalent of infant looking time. In our model, learning differs from standard self-organizing maps in
threeways. Firstly, the learning rate is higher than usual because rather than presenting the entire stimulus
set hundreds of times and learning very gradually, we aimed to simulate learning exactly as infants do, i.e.
presenting each stimulus exactly once. Secondly, the learning rate is adaptive (as in [44]) and changes with
the quantization error: the more novel a stimulus is (higher quantization error) the higher the learning rate
becomes. In other words, a surprising stimulus will affect the learning rate to a larger degree than an
expected one. This is in line with the finding that infants’ looking time during familiarization is higher
for more novel items, and this is interpreted as the time taken to incorporate that stimulus into the
category representation [43,48]. Thirdly, we consider a simplified case of self-organizing maps in which
only the BMU is involved in learning. In standard self-organizing maps learning affects both the best-
matching unit and its neighbouring units, which are also moved closer to the stimulus representation.
In our map only the BMU itself is moved, meaning the map does not necessarily form a topological
representation of the input space.
Assessing preferential looking after familiarization with a set of stimuli then implies measuring the
quantization error for each of the test stimuli. Again, quantization error is taken to correspond to
infant looking time. The expectation is that a within-category stimulus will be relatively close to an
existing unit, because one or more units were moved into its direction during training as BMUs of
familiarization exemplars. In other words, a within-category stimulus might share its BMU with one
or more familiarization stimuli. The result is that the within-category stimulus will not generate a
large quantization error. An OOC item, by contrast, will generate high error (i.e. be far away from the
best-matching unit) because no unit has been moved in that direction. A ‘preference score’ is then
calculated by directly comparing quantization error for the two items shown during a test trial.
A novelty preference is found if the quantization error is larger for an OOC item, whereas a null
preference is found if the quantization error is approximately the same for both test items.
SOMs implement a biologically plausible approach to human information processing that has been
applied to a wide range of cognitive phenomena (see [49] for a review). The big advantage of such a
model is that it allows us not just to probe the response to a given test stimulus after training. We can
also ask questions about the nature of the existing representations the model has learned, i.e. the
internal configuration of units and their distance to stimuli.
In our simulations, we used Younger’s [3] stimulus set. Previous approaches to simulating infant
familiarization with these images (e.g. [47,50,51]) have used auto-encoder networks using
backpropagation [52]. While this is similar to using SOMs in the sense that infant looking time in
both models is represented by classification error, the approaches differ in terms of how the models
are trained, and what the internal representation looks like.
Both approaches are capable of capturing sequence effects such as those demonstrated in Mather &
Plunkett’s data (see [47] for a simulation of that dataset using autoencoders). However, the mapping
of individual category exemplars to identical versus different BMUs, which provides immediate
insight into the internal category representation that is formed, make SOMs particularly intuitive to use
in our investigation.
4.1.1. Stimuli
The stimuli consist of 12 line drawings (figures 1 and 2) of novel animals—the so-called Broad condition
and test stimuli in [3]. Stimuli are defined by four features: length of the legs, length of the neck, tail width
and distance between the ears, which each can take five values (1–5). This means that 3333 represents the
‘overall average’ stimulus. This item is not shown during familiarization, but used as a test item. 5555 and
1111, the so-called ‘peripheral’ stimuli, which are as far as possible from this overall average, are used as the
remaining test items. Just like 3333, these items are not presented during familiarization.
Particularly relevant is the aspect that all familiarization stimuli consist of either features with values
1 and 5, or 2 and 4 (but not mixed). This means that each item is either relatively close to the overall
average (items with values 2 and 4) or quite far from the overall average (items with values 1 and 5).
We will refer to these as ‘near’ versus ‘far’ stimuli (for illustration, see figure 3).
The logic of the design is this: since infants are exposed to items with values 2/4, 1/5 during
familiarization, they are expected to form a category with a central tendency around 3333. Being
presented with 3333 versus 5555 or 1111 (peripheral items) on the test trials should then result in a
(a) similar-transition sequence and ‘near’ end stimulus
2244 1155 5151 4242 4422 5511 1515 2424
(b) dissimilar-transition sequence and ‘near’ end stimulus
2244 1515 5151 4242 2424 5511 1155 4422
(c) similar-transition sequence and ‘far’ end stimulus
5151 4242 4422 5511 1515 2424 2244 1155
(d) dissimilar-transition sequence and ‘far’ end stimulus
1155 5511 2244 4422 2424 4242 1515 5151
Figure 1. Examples of familiarization sequences in the four conditions. Note that each sequence contains the same set of eight
objects. (a) Similar-transition sequence and ‘near’ end stimulus, (b) dissimilar-transition sequence and ‘near end’ stimulus,
(c) similar-transition sequence and ‘far end’ stimulus, (d ) dissimilar-transition sequence and ‘far end’ stimulus.
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6preference for the peripheral item, as 3333 ought to appear relatively more familiar by this stage. Younger
[3], as well as Plunkett et al. [7] reported results consistent with this prediction.
It is also important to note that the exact sequence of stimuli during familiarization is relevant for
learning. Mather & Plunkett [46] exposed infants to sequences either involving mainly transitions
between highly similar items (e.g. from 2244 to 2424), or involving mainly transitions between highly
dissimilar items (e.g. from 1155 to 5511). These were termed ‘low Euclidean distance sequences’ and
‘high Euclidean distance’ sequences, respectively. Infants in the high distance (dissimilar transitions)
condition were more likely to show a preference for the peripheral test item than infants who saw a
sequence containing many transitions to similar stimuli, despite using the same set of stimuli in each
sequence. Here, we use a corresponding sequence manipulation in our simulations and experiments,
with the aim of dissociating the sequence effects from recency effects. In order to distinguish the
sequence manipulation from the other experimental manipulation (the type of final familiarization item)
we shall refer to the sequence types as similar-transition sequences (low Euclidean distance in [46])
versus dissimilar-transition sequences (high Euclidean distance in [46]). The final familiarization
stimulus types, by contrast, will be referred to as near (containing values 2/4; therefore nearer to the
overall average 3333) and far (containing values 1/5; therefore further away from the overall average 3333).
Inorder to train self-organizingmaps, thedrawingswere encodedas four-dimensional vectors (eachvalue
corresponding to one feature). These were obtained as described by Mareschal & French [51], see table 1.
4.1.2. Formal model specification
Our model is a self-organizing map (SOM), schematically depicted in figure 4.
3333 1111 5555 novel
Figure 2. Test stimuli: Average (3333), peripheral stimuli (1111 or 5555) and novel OOC item.
11111
1155
2244 4242
3333
2424 4422
5511
5555
1515
5151
2 4 53
2
4
5
3
ta
il 
w
id
th
leg length
far
far
near
near
average
test stimulus
peripheral
test stimulus
peripheral
test stimulus
Figure 3. Illustration of the feature space, using just the first two features to allow a two-dimensional representation. ‘Near’ stimuli
are closer to the overall average (3333) in terms of Euclidean distance; ‘far’ stimuli are further away.
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rsos
R.Soc.Open
Sci.7:200328
7A SOM is a set of units, spatially organized in a rectangular grid. We use a map with nine units, as in
[44]. Each map unit u is associated with a weight vectorWu of the same dimension of the input vectors (in
this case of dimension 4). We will sometimes call Wu the ‘representation’ associated with the unit u. All
weight vectors taken together can be seen as the map’s representation of the world. At the beginning,
they are initialized to very small random values. During training, the input vectors are sequentially
presented to the network. After each presentation, the BMU is identified as the unit whose weight
vector is closest to the input vector itself (in Euclidean distance). Next, weights are adjusted to
decrease the difference between the current input vector and the weight vector associated with the
BMU according to equation (4.1)
Wu(tþ 1) ¼Wu(t)þ a(t)  hu,BMU(t)(I(t)Wu(t)), (4:1)
where Wu(t + 1) and Wu(t) are the weight vectors associated with unit u at time t + 1 and t, respectively;
a(t) is the learning rate (see discussion below); h is the neighbourhood function and hu,BMU(t) indicates the
distance between u and BMU at time t: in our model the neighbourhood function is the Kronecker
function (i.e. for all t, hu,BMU(t) = 1 if u = BMU, 0 otherwise). This is different from standard self-
organizing maps in which the neighbourhood function is a Gaussian involving several units of the
map. I(t) is the input vector presented to the network at time t. For the best-matching unit BMU and
for input I(t), the Euclidean distance between I(t) and WBMU(t) is called the quantization error (qerr for
short) of the network with respect to I(t).
qerr ¼ kI(t)WBMU(t)k: (4:2)
Figure 4. The self-organizing map.
Table 1. Stimulus encoding for the Younger [3] stimuli.
legs neck tail ears
0.27 1.00 0.22 1.00
0.27 0.23 1.00 1.00
0.45 0.81 0.41 0.78
0.45 0.42 0.80 0.78
0.82 0.42 0.80 0.33
0.82 0.81 0.41 0.33
1.00 0.23 1.00 0.11
1.00 1.00 0.22 0.11
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8The main differences between the current model and standard SOMs are the simplified
neighbourhood function and an adaptive learning rate a(t) which, unlike standard SOMs, depends on
the quantization error (the higher the quantization error, the higher the learning rate).
The learning rate is defined as:
a ¼ max(0, min(1, b  expa ffiffiffiffiffiffiqerrp )): (4:3)
For the simulations presented here, the parameters are set to α = 1.8, β = 0.4. The model’s learning rate has
two important properties. First, it is typically higher than in standard SOMs. This permits the network to
be trained in an analogous fashion to the infant familiarization procedure: presenting each familiarization
stimulus to the network just once, rather than training the network over hundreds of epochs, effectively
presenting each stimulus many times. Second, because the learning rate depends on the quantization
error, the more novel the incoming stimulus, the higher the learning rate will be. In this way, the
learning rate is related to attention in infants: the adaptive learning rate corresponds to the general
finding that infants pay more attention to novel stimuli rather than to familiar ones. This is consistent
with theoretical and computational models of habituation such as the comparator theory [48,53,54].4.2. Simulation 1: preliminary simulations to model sequence effects
In order to simulate the infant results reported by Mather & Plunkett [46], we trained 24 SOMs
(corresponding to 24 infants) in the two conditions containing original similar-transition sequences
and dissimilar-transition sequences (low versus high Euclidean distance sequences in their
terminology). Each simulation involved one stimulus sequence used in their original work.
After each network was trained, we assessed category formation by measuring network looking time,
i.e. the quantization error associated with the BMU (see above), at the test stimuli. As with the infant
experiments, a preference score was calculated by dividing network looking time at the peripheral test
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rsos
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9stimulus by the overall network looking time at the test stimuli (network looking time at the average test
stimulus + network looking time at the peripheral test stimulus).
For each condition, the average of these preference scores for all networks was calculated, and
compared to the corresponding preference scores presented by Mather & Plunkett [46]. The model
reproduced Mather & Plunkett’s [46] results with infants: networks familiarized with dissimilar-
transition sequences exhibited a stronger novelty preference for the peripheral test stimulus than those
familiarized with similar-transition sequences. The average preference score for similar-transition
sequences was 0.59, whereas in the dissimilar-transition sequences it was 0.66. A two-tailed t-test
indicated this difference was significant (t46 = 60, p < 0.001). Results were robust (i.e. held in more than
75% of the cases) when the learning rate parameter α was in the range from 0.1 to 4, and β ranged
from 0.1 to 1.
However, we further observed in these simulations that another explanation for differences between
the conditions could be the final familiarization stimulus. Since sequences in [46] were optimized for
minimal/maximal transition similarity, the sequences in their dissimilar-transition sequences (high
Euclidean distance) ended in ‘near’ stimuli, and those in similar-transition sequences (low Euclidean
distance) ended in ‘far’ items. This was particularly predictive of the behaviour at test—there seemed
to be a clear recency effect in the dataset. However, using these existing sequences, it is impossible to
evaluate the relative contributions of Euclidean distance (transition similarity) and recency effects. For
this reason, we created a new set of sequences, crossing the factors transition similarity and recency.:2003284.3. Simulation 2: main simulations of recency effects
To test the hypothesis that preferential looking at test is driven primarily by recency effects we set up a
new set of simulations. The aim was (i) to understand the mathematical underpinnings of the recency
effects, and (ii) to provide a testable prediction for a further set of infant studies. In order to evaluate
the hypothesis that transition similarity (average Euclidean distance between successive stimuli) is the
most important factor, as maintained by Mather & Plunkett [46], we constructed the simulations in a
2 × 2 design with factors transition similarity and end stimulus type.
This involved the following combinations: similar-transition sequence and ‘near’ end stimulus;
similar-transition sequence and ‘far’ end stimulus; dissimilar-transition sequence and ‘near’ end
stimulus; dissimilar-transition sequence and ‘far’ end stimulus. Figure 1 shows example sequences.
We selected sequences on the basis of having extremely low or extremely high average transition
similarity (in order to maximize the potential difference of this variable, cf. [46]) and ending with near
or far stimuli, keeping the average transition similarity equal across end stimulus type.1
On the basis that infant studies using this stimulus set typically included 24 infants per condition
[3,7,46], we trained 24 SOMs in each condition (with 24 different sequences, just as 24 infants are
typically exposed to 24 different sequences, see below in ‘Infant experiment’). We then tested whether
the SOM exhibited a preference for the average or peripheral test stimulus, by presenting each
stimulus in turn (3333 or 1111/5555) and calculating the corresponding quantization errors.4.3.1. Results
These simulations revealed a much more pronounced preference for the peripheral item after training
with sequences ending in near stimuli compared to sequences ending in far stimuli. In other words,
the model predicts a recency effect. The results, depicted in figure 5, show the proportion of network
looking time directed at the peripheral test stimulus out of the total network looking time for the
four conditions.2
For these simulations, an ANOVA with factors transition similarity (similar-transition sequence
versus dissimilar-transition sequence) and end stimulus type (near versus far) revealed a main effect
of end stimulus type (F1,92 = 65.73, p < 0.001), no main effect of transition similarity (F1,92 = 0.39,
p = 0.5), and a trend for an interaction of transition similarity × end stimulus: (F1,92 = 3.0, p = 0.08).1A side effect of minimizing/maximizing transition similarity is that the first stimulus in the sequence is from the same category (near
or far) as the final stimulus. The implications of this constraint are discussed below.
2Note that the lack of variability we observe in the model results is a direct consequence of three factors: (i) the high learning rate, (ii) no
noise being introduced in the stimulus encoding, and (iii) training involving only eight weight updates.
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Figure 5. Model preference scores for the peripheral stimulus in test trial 1. Boxes show quartiles, whiskers show the range. Grey
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10The model’s prediction of a recency effect (end stimulus type) is robust, holding in more than 75% of
the cases in the parameter range considered. If the final familiarization stimulus is ‘near’, the network
predicts a stronger novelty preference than if the final stimulus is ‘far’.
In order to assess representations in the SOMs and gain further insight into the learning mechanism,
specifically with regard to the question of why the model exhibits recency effects, we determined the
number of different BMUs activated per simulation. This showed that 12% of simulations used four
different BMUs, 45% used three different units, 43% of simulations used two, and no simulations relied on
a single BMU. The number of different BMUs was further not the same across conditions. An ANOVA
with factors transition similarity and end stimulus type revealed a main effect of the end stimulus type
(F1,92 = 5.81, p = 0.018), a main effect of transition similarity (F1,92 = 7.46, p = 0.008), and an interaction of
transition similarity × end stimulus type (F1,92 = 4.36, p = 0.040). Post hoc tests showed that sequences with a
‘near’ end stimulus and low transition similarity typically used more different BMUs (M = 3.17, med = 3,
s.e. = 0.115, p < 0.05) than all other sequences (similar/far: M = 2.58, med = 3, s.e. = 0.119; dissimilar/near:
M = 2.54, med = 2, s.e. = 0.134; dissimilar/far:M = 2.50, med = 2, s.e. = 0.147).4.4. Discussion
The result of our simulations clearly shows that the end stimulus type is the dominant factor in
determining responses at test. The preference for the peripheral test stimulus is much stronger for
sequences ending in ‘near’ items than for those sequences ending in ‘far’ items. In other words, the
model’s behaviour is completely consistent with a recency effect, whereas the effect of the average
transition similarity across the whole of the familiarization phase (as indexed by the trend for an
interaction) plays only a minor role.
How does this come about? Inspecting internal representations in the SOMs allows us to gain more
insight. Initially, a BMU is selected for the first observed stimulus, and its vector representation is
updated accordingly. For subsequently presented stimuli, this BMU is either updated to match the
incoming stimulus or, if there is a different, better-matching unit, that other unit is chosen as the
BMU. Due to the high learning rate, at every point in time the item that is likely to cause lowest error
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11in the model is always the most recently presented exemplar (as individual unit vectors have just been
adjusted to match that item).
At the time the test item is reached, similarity between the previous item and the test item therefore
matters a lot. If the most recent item was a ‘near’ exemplar, its BMU will have been adjusted towards the
‘near’ feature values. It is therefore likely that the model’s BMU for the average test stimulus (3333) will
be that same unit, and quantization error will be low. For the peripheral test stimulus (1111/5555) another
BMU will most likely be selected and its quantization error will be higher than the average test stimulus’s
one (even if the same unit is selected as best-matching, it cannot match as well as for the average, and
necessarily produces higher quantization error).
The inverse holds for training sequences ending in ‘far’ items: because the BMU for that last item was
just moved towards those far feature values, the existence of a unit with feature values close to the
average is no longer guaranteed. For this reason, the quantization error for the two test items is likely
to be quite similar, with no preference emerging. Geometrically speaking, with a sequence ending in a
‘near’ stimulus, the current category representation is close to the overall average. With a sequence
ending in a ‘far’ stimulus, the category representation lies between the overall average and the
peripheral stimulus.3
The difference between sequences also had an effect on the internal representation of the categories in
terms of the number of different BMUs selected during training. Dissimilar-transition sequences ending
in a ‘near’ item led to a more distributed representation involving more BMUs, compared to the other
sequence types. The internal representation of categories therefore seems to depend on both factors,
transition similarity and end stimulus type.
Partially responsible for the recency effect is the adaptive learning rate: If the learning rate is
sufficiently high, the update overrides previous representations, and as a result the last experienced
stimulus will be the best represented one. Note that this adaptive learning rate was not built into the
model explicitly to cause a recency effect, but merely to incorporate what we know about the
interplay of relative novelty of an item, and subsequently increased looking time (cf. [44]).
The model offers a clear set of predictions regarding the conditions under which infants should
exhibit a preference for the peripheral test stimulus when familiarization sequences are carefully
controlled for transition similarity and final familiarization stimulus type. In particular, the model
predicts that this preference should be enhanced when the final familiarization item is ‘near’.
In the following section, we present data from 10-month-old infants, familiarized with the same
sequences as the models in this section, in order to put this prediction to the test.5. Infant experiment: testing recency effects in 10-month-olds
5.1. Methods
5.1.1. Participants
In total, 96 infants (mean age: 311 days (range: 289–329 days); 47 females) took part in this study. Aiming
for 24 infants in each condition, as in previous work, we recruited 135 infants in total to allow for the
typical drop-out rate. Thirty-nine infants were excluded due to technical reasons (N = 12) or a failure
to reach looking time criteria (N = 27). The looking time criteria were as follows: infants were excluded
if they missed three or more trials during familiarization or if their total looking time was lower than
2 standard deviations below the mean total familiarization time. These criteria were applied in order
to ensure that the set of infants we are comparing at test had similar amounts of exposure to the
target category. Infants were further excluded if they missed trial 1 or 8 or test trial 1, as these were
critical to our design. The remaining 96 infants were allocated to one of four conditions, similar-
transition sequence and ‘near’ end stimulus (N = 26), similar-transition sequence and ‘far’ end
stimulus (N = 22), dissimilar-transition sequence and ‘near’ end stimulus (N = 25) and dissimilar-
transition sequence and ‘far’ end stimulus (N = 23). Infants were previously recruited from the
maternity ward of the local hospital and had no known auditory or visual impairments.3Due to the nature of the feature distribution, the category representation can mathematically never be quite so close to the
peripheral item as to the overall average. For this reason, in absolute terms, we always see a preference for the peripheral item
(preference scores > 0.5).
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rsos
R.Soc.Open
Sci.7:200328
125.1.2. Stimuli and design
Infants were familiarized with stimulus sequences corresponding to those used to train the model. As
explained above, these came in four conditions which differed with regard to transition similarity
(similar/dissimilar) and were further constrained to contain either ‘near’ (feature values 2/4) or ‘far’
(feature values 1/5) end stimuli.
The test stimuli were the overall average stimulus (3333), two peripheral stimuli (1111/5555), and an
OOC object and were identical for all four conditions (figure 2).
5.1.3. Procedure
After arrival at the laboratory, written consent was obtained from carers and the procedure was explained
by the experimenter. Infants were allowed to play with some toys during this period which lasted no
longer than 10min. Infants were then seated on the carer’s lap in front of a large television screen
(110 × 95 cm) at a distance of approximately 90 cm. The screen was located in a booth with dark grey
walls, and a curtain was closed behind the carer’s chair. The carer was instructed to keep their eyes
closed and to not interact with the infant or interfere with their looking. The carer was also wearing
headphones and listening to music. For the duration of the experiment, the experimenter was in a
control room adjacent to the testing booth, and watched the infant’s face via a camera system.
After two animations that served to direct infants’ attention to the centre of the screen infants were
presented with eight familiarization trials, followed by four test trials. All trials were 10 s in length.
During the eight familiarization trials, a single familiarization image was displayed either on the left-
or right-hand side of the screen (at 2.5° visual angle from the centre). During the test trials, two
images were shown side-by-side in the same positions as the familiarization stimuli. All images
subtended 13.73° visual angle. The first two test trials paired one of the peripheral stimuli with the
overall average (either 1111 and 3333, or 5555 and 3333). The location of the average stimulus was
switched between the two trials, and its location on the first test trial was counterbalanced across
participants. Test trials 3 and 4 involved the OOC stimulus. On one of the two trials this was paired
with the overall average (3333) and on the other it was paired with the same peripheral stimulus that
appeared in test trials 1 and 2. The order of the two cases was counterbalanced across infants. The
location of the OOC stimulus was switched between test trials 3 and 4, and its location on trial 3 was
counterbalanced across participants. Note that the model only makes predictions for the first test trial.
Test performance in the model is assessed without further updating the model’s weights. Infants, on
the other hand, continue updating their mental representation after familiarization ends—there is no
mechanism to ‘fix’ the representation after trial 8. Their mental status after the first test trial is
therefore not simulated in the model. We included test trials 2–4 in our report of the infant
experiment because such trials can provide further information about infants’ mental categories. The
novelty preference trials (test trials 3 and 4) are necessary in infant studies to determine whether
infants are in familiarity preference or novelty preference mode during tests 1 and 2. Trials 2 and 4
are included for counterbalancing purposes and to guard against side biases in individual infants.
Trials were initiated manually by the experimenter after confirming that the infant’s gaze was
directed at the screen. If the infant was not paying attention to the screen between trials, the
experimenter attracted attention to the display by talking to the infant via a microphone, e.g. by
saying ‘Look (baby’s name)! What can you see?’ (or similar) in an infant-directed voice. The infant’s
face was filmed by two cameras mounted above the screen one on the left-hand side and one on the
right-hand side.
5.2. Results
The video streams from left and right cameras were manually scored frame-by-frame for infants’ gaze
direction (Intercoder reliability: r = 0.96, on approx. 5% of trials independently double-scored).
5.2.1. Looking time during familiarization
To evaluate the degree of infant familiarization, we split the learning phase into two blocks of four trials
(block 1: trials 1–4; block 2: trials 5–8) in order to compare how much time infants spent investigating a
stimulus at the beginning versus the end of familiarization. Average trial looking times were obtained
for each infant and each block. Figure 6 depicts the looking time data for each condition and block.
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13Overall, looking times were longest for dissimilar-transition sequences with ‘far’ end stimulus, and
shortest in the similar-transition sequences with ‘near’ end stimulus. These looking time data were
subjected to a mixed measures ANOVA with within-subjects factor block (1,2) and between-subjects
factors transition similarity (similar versus dissimilar) and end stimulus type (near versus far). This
revealed a main effect of block (F1,92 = 7.232, p = 0.009, h2p ¼ 0:073) and a trend for a block × transition
similarity interaction (F1,92 = 3.262, p = 0.074). Paired t-tests confirmed that looking time decreased
between blocks 1 and 2 for similar-transition sequences (t47 = 3.667, p = 0.001, d = 0.53; individual
conditions: similar-transition sequence and ‘near’ end stimulus: t25 = 3.401, p = 0.002, d = 0.67; similar-
transition sequence and ‘far’ end stimulus: t21 = 1.78, p = 0.089, d = 0.38), but did not differ
systematically for dissimilar-transition sequences (t47 = 0.568, p = 0.573). This indicates that infants
seeing similar-transition sequences were familiarized to a greater degree than infants seeing
dissimilar-transition sequences. This is consistent with the hypothesis that sequences with transitions
to dissimilar items maintain attention better than sequences with transitions to similar items due to
the greater novelty of successive stimuli [45].5.2.2. Categorization: test trial 1
Since the model simulates test trial 1 only, this is the most important trial for our purpose.
In order to assess categorization performance, preference scores were obtained from each participant
by dividing the time spent looking at the peripheral stimulus, 1111/5555, by the time spent looking at
both test stimuli, average and peripheral (see figure 7 for results). The resulting preference scores from
the first test trial were subjected to an ANOVA with factors transition similarity (similar versus
dissimilar) and end stimulus type (far versus near). This revealed a main effect of end stimulus type
(F1,92 = 6.242, p = 0.014, h2p ¼ 0:064). All other effects remained non-significant (all Fs < 0.31, ps > 0.57).
Follow-up t-tests on collapsed data showed that infants in the ‘near’ end stimulus conditions exhibited
a preference for the peripheral stimulus on test trial 1 (looking proportion for 1111/5555: M = 0.58,
s.e. = 0.03; t50 = 2.882, p = 0.006, d = 0.4; a Bayesian one-sample t-test resulted in BF10 = 5.929, which
implies sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis), whereas infants in the ‘far’ end stimulus
conditions exhibited no preference (looking proportion for 1111/5555: M = 0.49, s.e. = 0.02; t44 = 0.564,
p = 0.576).4 The ANOVA results, revealing only a main effect of end stimulus type, confirm the
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Figure 7. Infant preference scores for the peripheral stimulus in test trial 1. Boxes show quartiles, whiskers show the range. Grey
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14model’s prediction that novelty preference is driven by a recency effect, in particular with effects of
transition similarity not modulating results further.
5.2.3. Categorization: test trial 2
Although the model makes no predictions for test trial 2, this trial can provide further insight into the
infants’ behaviour. The observed pattern of looking was clearly different from test trial 1. An ANOVA
with factors transition similarity and end stimulus type revealed a significant interaction (F1,90 = 7.309,
p = 0.008, h2p ¼ 0:077). No other effects were significant (all Fs < 0.74, ps > 0.39). Further analysis of the
interaction showed that only infants familiarized with dissimilar-transition sequences that ended on a
‘far’ stimulus had a significant preference for the peripheral stimulus (M = 0.6, s.e. = 0.2, t23 = 2.47, p =
0.022, d = 0.5). Preferential looking in all other conditions did not differ from chance (0.5; all ts < 1.2,
ps > 0.24; individual conditions: similar-transition sequence/near M = 0.53, s.e. = 0.04; dissimilar-
transition sequence/near M = 0.44, s.e. = 0.05; similar-transition sequence/far M = 0.43, s.e. = 0.06).
5.2.4. Novelty preference: test trials 3 and 4
In order to establish that looking on the first test trials was driven by novelty preference rather than
familiarity preference, preference scores were obtained for test trials 3 and 4 by dividing the amount
of looking at the novel stimulus by the total looking time for each trial. An ANOVA with repeated
factors trial number (3,4) and fixed factors trial order (‘novel versus peripheral’ first, ‘novel versus
average’ first), transition similarity, and end stimulus type revealed only a main effect of trial order
(F1,81 = 6.38, p = 0.013, h2p ¼ 0:073). All other effects were non-significant (Fs < 2.3, ps≥ 0.14). Follow-up
tests showed that infants who saw the ‘novel versus peripheral’ test first exhibited significant novelty
preference on both trials (trial 3, novel and peripheral items: M = 0.68, s.e. = 0.036, t46 = 4.925, p < 0.001,4Single-sample t-tests against chance for individual conditions result in the following: similar-transition sequence and ‘near’ end
stimulus M = 0.58, s.e. = 0.03, t25 = 2.675, p = 0.013, d = 0.53; dissimilar-transition sequence and ‘near’ end stimulus M = 0.59, s.e. =
0.05, t24 = 1.746, p = 0.094, d = 0.35; Bayesian one-sample t-test: BF10 = 0.784, implying insufficient evidence to accept/reject the null
hypothesis; similar-transition sequence and ‘far’ end stimulus M = 0.50, s.e. = 0.04, t21 = 0.039, p > 0.96; dissimilar-transition sequence
and ‘far’ end stimulus M = 0.47, s.e. = 0.03, t22 = 1.05, p > 0.30.
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15d = 0.72; trial 4, novel and average item: M = 0.58, t43 = 2.354, p = 0.023, d = 0.28). Infants who were
presented with the ‘novel versus average’ item first did not reach significant levels of novelty
preference but showed trends on both trials (trial 3, novel versus average item: M = 0.56, s.e. = 0.03,
t46 = 1.82, p = 0.075, d = 0.27; trial 4, novel versus peripheral item: M = 0.55, s.e. = 0.03, t45 = 1.723,
p = 0.092, d = 0.28).
5.3. Discussion of experimental findings
Test trial 1 is the critical trial in terms of testing the model, since the simulation only generates predictions
for one test immediately after familiarization.
The main effect of end stimulus type found for test trial 1 in the infant experiments indicates that a
recency effect is the strongest factor, just as predicted by the model. As expected, infants who saw a ‘near’
stimulus on familiarization trial 8 exhibited a preference for the peripheral stimulus on test trial 1. For
these groups, the average stimulus appeared relatively familiar at the time they were presented with
test trial 1. Infants in the groups with a ‘far’ stimulus on trial 8 on the other hand did not exhibit any
preference on test trial 1. In other words, we find a recency effect. The peripheral stimulus appears,
after the ‘near’ stimulus on trial 8, as much more surprising than the overall average. Infants in the
groups with a ‘far’ stimulus on trial 8 on the other hand did not exhibit any preference on test trial 1.
Empirically, this is surprising since the conventional prediction, according to which sequence does not
matter, would be that infants should exhibit a preference for the peripheral stimulus, just as reported
by Younger [3]. If we only consider the infant results obtained here, it is difficult to say whether
children exposed to sequences ending in a ‘far’ item learned at all—a null preference is consistent
with not having formed a category. However, we also know that the model—which clearly
‘categorizes’ successfully—predicts a main effect, and in particular a shift of looking towards a null
preference. It therefore seems plausible that, rather than not forming a category at all, infants
successfully formed a category in the ‘far’ conditions—one whose centroid is simply located closer to
the peripheral stimulus. In fact, according to the model the category representation should be located
at a point in between the overall average and the peripheral test item, which mathematically makes
both items approximately equally interesting. While the modelling result does not provide conclusive
evidence that this is indeed reflective of processes in infants, this is nevertheless a plausible explanation.
Regardless of whether or not infants successfully formed a category in the ‘far’ conditions, we can
conclude that recency effects are important in infant categorization. This is in line with a view of
category formation as a fluid, moment-to-moment process that does not result in clear boundaries but
representations that are biased by recent experiences: looking time is dependent on priming effects,
and this is the consequence of a system that is malleable and adaptive to context.
What our approach does highlight, therefore, is the necessity to take the familiarization sequence (and
in particular the final item) seriously as a factor in interpreting looking time. We believe, in fact, that
doing so can in some circumstances prevent null results from emerging because different sequences
produce systematically different results. The present results provide just such an example: had we
collapsed the data from the ‘near’ and ‘far’ conditions, we would have obtained an overall non-
significant difference between dissimilar- and similar-transition conditions (t94 = 0.226, p = 0.821), with
single sample t-tests indicating that preferences in dissimilar-transition sequences did not differ from
chance (M = 0.53, s.e. = 0.03, t47 = 1.08, p = 0.29), and a trend in the similar-transition sequences (M =
0.54, s.e. = 0.02, t47 = 1.7, p = 0.097; BF10 = 0.586, implying insufficient evidence to either accept or reject
the null hypothesis).5 As our results above show, infants’ responses by contrast vary systematically
depending on the final familiarization item, and indeed there is a significant preference for those
sequences ending with a ‘near’ item.
Returning to our findings, one question begs to be answered: did infants simply ignore the first seven
familiarization items? In other words, is it possible that test behaviour is solely a response to the last item,
rather than a response to a set of items? While test trial 1 shows a clear divide between ‘near’ and ‘far’
conditions but no role of the familiarization sequence, test trial 2 reveals that infants are not solely
responding to that single item. If they ignored the first seven items, then both ‘near’ and both ‘far’
conditions should show identical results even on test trial 2. By contrast, infants in the ‘far’ condition
who saw a dissimilar-transition sequence show a preference for the peripheral item, and those who
saw a similar-transition sequence continue to exhibit a null preference. Any difference between two5Note that this experiment does not use identical sequences to those used in [46], since we maximized/minimized overall Euclidean
distance while also holding it stable across sequences with near/‘far’ end stimuli.
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16conditions with the same type of end stimulus on familiarization is evidence that infants are processing,
not ignoring, the first seven items. The behaviour shown here is further consistent with the idea that
infants in dissimilar-transition sequences continue to learn, whereas the more homogeneous similar-
transition sequences lead infants to be familiarized to a greater degree.
One further aspect of familiarization needs to be addressed: to test the competing factors of transition
similarity versus end stimulus, we selected sequences that minimized/maximized the Euclidean distance.
However, due to combinatorics this necessarily results in sequences that either start and end in a ‘near’
stimulus, or that start and end in a ‘far’ stimulus. How can we rule out that in fact a primacy effect
caused the differences we observed? We suggest that if such were the case infants’ category
representation should be very settled (rather than fluid) by the time they reach test trials. Test trial 2
should, then, have been very similar to test trial 1, or at any rate the two ‘near’ and the two ‘far’
conditions should have resulted in similar patterns, respectively, which they did not (for the ‘far’
conditions). Consequently, we rule out that our results are driven by primacy effects.R.Soc.Open
Sci.7:2003286. General discussion
In this paper, we have presented a view of infant categorization under which representations are fluid and
adaptable, rather than static, and in which memory plays a major role. Preferential looking is a response to
the input encountered on a moment-to-moment basis. As a direct consequence of this, the last item
presented during a familiarization phase becomes the strongest factor determining behaviour at test.
Our computational model incorporates this behaviour by using an adaptive learning rate that responds
to novelty, and ensures that the most recent experiences are reflected most strongly in the category
representation. Recency effects are observed in the model as the outcome of this adaptive behaviour.
We presented a set of simulations that provided precise predictions of infant behaviour in a tightly
controlled familiarization study where mathematical similarity properties of the stimuli are known. In
particular, we pitched the average similarity between successive items—a factor previously thought to
determine learning outcomes—against recency effects, or the impact of the final item in the
familiarization sequence. Both in the model predictions and in the subsequent infant study using the
same familiarization sequences, recency effects dominated test performance. Familiarization with a
sequence ending in a ‘near’ stimulus, i.e. one that was close to the overall average of the stimulus set,
led to a preference for a peripheral test item (over the average item). Familiarization with a sequence
ending in a ‘far’ item, by contrast, resulted in a null preference in the infants. This main effect of end
stimulus type was present in both model simulations and infants.
Inspecting the model’s internal representation further suggested that the main effect, i.e. a shift
towards a null preference in the ‘far’ conditions, may be the consequence of a category representation
whose central tendency is between the two test stimuli, rather than reflecting a failure to learn. The
model learns in all cases, but its internal representation at test time is biased by the immediately
preceding stimulus, such that sequences ending in ‘far’ stimuli necessarily lead to a representation for
which both types of test stimulus are approximately equally interesting.
Our results, demonstrating that the final familiarization item carries considerable importance in
determining test outcome, have implications for experimental design. The identity of the final
familiarization item should form a part of the experimental design, rather than being factored out by
randomizing stimuli. We argue here that this may obscure systematic patterns in infants’ performance,
in particular when null preferences are obtained. We demonstrated that our set of data would only
have resulted in trends without taking this factor into account. Rather than representing a failure to
learn, this is instead the consequence of highly systematic behaviour in response to our (specifically
selected) stimulus sequences.
The model and data we presented here show that categorization behaviour in infancy is a continuous,
dynamic process. The representation of a category is updated on a moment-to-moment basis and biased
by most recent experiences. In other words, behaviour on any one trial is primed by the previously
seen exemplar. Recency effects as demonstrated here are not a failure of the system to extract an
unbiased central tendency of the stimuli. They are the output of a system that is highly adaptive and
context-sensitive. These very properties allow cognition to be flexible and create representations that are
useful in any given context. The most recent experiences, still represented in memory, are weighted most
strongly. Directly observed contrasts, not just general novelty, are therefore emphasized. In our model,
representations are constantly adjusted to accommodate new impressions and the 10-month-olds in our
study behaved exactly as one would predict if they incorporated such a mechanism.
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that we obtained the predicted results is no guarantee that model and infants learn in similar ways.
Finding further parallels between model and infant behaviour would be a strong argument for the
model’s validity.
In conclusion, we propose that infant categorization needs to be viewed as context-driven and
dynamic, and as such inherently anchored in memory processes. Recency effects are an inherent
property of a system that supports flexible adaptation to environments and contexts.
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